Proportional Representation Committee of

Effective Voting

THE

Basis of Good Municipal Government

AN EXPOSITION OF THE

PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE

OF

PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.

Issued by the Proportional Representation Committee of Ontario.

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CHAPTER I.

A PRETTY FAIR MUNICIPAL STORY.

Telling How the Leading Citizens of Prettyfair Town Had an Important Informal Meeting, and of the Ideas They Got —Practical Suggestions to Advocates of Municipal Reform.

Our story relates to the pleasant little town of Prettyfair. Where is that town situated? Oh, well, that doesn't much matter—say in South Australia. There are many towns like it all over Anglo-Saxondom.

Municipal matters were in a bad way in Prettyfair. It was the same old story; the same old complaints were made that we have all heard so often: Too much poor material in the Town Council; hard to get the best men—the able men—to run; general politics introduced into municipal matters; the hail-fellow-well-met style of ward politician gets the big pull always; councillors spend more time in wrangling and jawing one another than in attending to town business in a business-like way. Result, slipshod methods and general inefficiency.

One day a few of the leading men of the town met in an informal way to talk the matter over, in view of a coming municipal election, and to try and find a remedy. The first proposition was the one that most of us are familiar with; namely, "Let us make a determined effort to get good men in the council irrespective of party." Said one citizen, "Now, here is our friend, Mr. Backbone; he would make a splendid councilman. Will you run in your ward, Mr. Backbone?"

"Not if I know it," replied Backbone. "That fellow Windigasser would be sure to run against me. He has got the pull with the Starry Knights and the Sons of the Morning, and has made himself solid in the ward generally. I am not going to put myself in the position of being the beaten opponent of a man like Windigasser."

"Oh, well," said another, "but a man of your standing in the town could beat him if you made an active canvass."

"Possibly so," answered Backbone, "but I cannot spare the time or the energy from my business; and even if I could, I would not feel inclined to. If the people of Prettyfair want me to do work for them, they will have to elect me without my going round begging and canvassing for permission to serve them."

"Well," suggested another of the party, "here is Mr. Tippelknot. He is a good executive man of high standing in the town, and would have the Temperance vote on his side. Why not run in your ward, Mr. Tippelknot?"

Tippelknot shook his head. "What good would the Temperance vote do me there?" said he. "If I could get a fair proportion of the Temperance vote of the whole town, it would be all right; but the Temperance vote in my own ward is not enough. You know that Goodbar, who is the council now, has the whole liquor interest with him. Besides, he is on the other side of politics, and it would be made a political matter, and his side has a

majority in our ward. No, it won't work."

Mr. Clearcut, Mr. Square, Mr. Footdown and Mr. Goodhead, were successively appealed to, with a like result. None of them would become candidates.

"It seems to me," remarked Clearcut, "that no immediate remedy is possible. The root of the difficulty is in the ward system, along with our plan of election, which gives every facility for the introduction of party politics where they are only mischievous. You all know that it is not the better class of party men who introduce party politics. Some narrow-minded partizans nominate candidates of one political stripe all along the line, and then the other side follow suit in self-defence; or, perhaps each side nominates to head off the other side."

Square looked at him thoughtfully. "The ward system is a very poor one; but can you get anything better in its place? If you had voting at large all over the town, it would mean that the party which had even a narrow majority would put in all the councillors. They have tried that plan in the United States."

Goodhead now joined in the discussion. "You are right, Square; but voting at large is not the only way. We have about twelve hundred voters in the town—at least, that is the average number who vote—and we return twelve councillors. Divide one by the other, and you get a hundred votes to each councillor. Now, suppose you had a system by which any hundred voters in any part of the town could elect a councilman to represent them; how would that work? Say, Backbone, couldn't you be dead sure of a hundred votes if you were running, and had the whole town to draw from?"

"He could get double that number without canvassing a single elector," broke in Footdown, with emphasis.

"And you, Tippelknot," pursued Goodhead, "couldn't you get considerably over a hundred votes, if you were not pinned down to one ward for your Temperance supporters?"

"No doubt of that," answered Tippelknot. "The idea looks good. But wouldn't you waste a great many votes? How could you fix it so that only about the hundred votes would be cast for your man, or at any rate, only enough more to make sure of his election?"

"Oh, that is easy enough. Arrange it so that when the votes were counted only enough to elect a man would be credited to him, and the remainder transferred to some other candidate indicated by the electors themselves each on his own ballot."

Another of the party here remarked that there were too many councilmen anyhow; that nine would do the business better than twelve.

"I quite agree with you," replied Goodhead. "The experience of some cities that have lessened the number of wards goes that way. The abolition of our six wards would make it easy to reduce the number of councillors to nine. By thus making the whole town one large constituency, electing nine councillors, and electing them by a good plan of proportional representation, any candidate who was a good enough man to command one-ninth of the votes of the whole electorate would be elected. The better element of the community scattered over the whole town, could unite freely to return really good men, in exact proportion to their voting strength. Men like our friends Backbone and Tippelknot would then

be willing to run, because their election could be made reasonably certain."

"But," objected Mr. Gosloe, "is not the ward system necessary to prevent injustice being done to some section of the town, in the matter of sidewalks or other public accommodations, by reason of its not being represented?"

Clearcut answered him: "Proportional representation of the whole town effects that very object better than the ward system does; because if a sectional matter became very important, the people of that section could get a candidate specially to represent their interests, if they were strong enough in numbers; they would not be confined to any hard and fast ward boundaries; and they might draw scattering votes from sympathisers all over town."

After an animated discussion of details, there appeared to be a general agreement with the ideas of Clearcut and Goodhead.

CHAPTER II.

WARDS AND THE MULTIPLE VOTE.

The very foundation of good municipal government is a fair and scientific system of voting; because all popular government is based on the popular vote, and if the system of voting is bad, the municipal government cannot be good.

"Proportional Representation" is a fair and scientific system that is being much advocated now-a-days. An essential part of this system, as applied to municipal government, is to abolish the existing ward divisions. In this direction a large step was taken at the 1897-8 session of the Ontario Legislature. The provisions are briefly as follows:

WHAT THE STATUTE SAYS.

1. The Council of every township shall consist of one reeve, who shall be the head thereof, and four councillors, who shall be elected by a general vote. (61 Victoria, chapter 23, section 4.)

2. Precisely the same words apply to villages. Every village is to have its reeve, and the election of its four councillors is to be by "a general vote"—which means no wards. (61 Vic., chap. 23, sec. 3.)

3. The Council of every town having a population of not more than five thousand by the last Canadian census shall consist of a Mayor, who shall be the head thereof, and of six councillors to be elected by a general vote. (61 Vic., chap. 23, sec. 2.)

So that municipalities with less than five thousand of a population are not allowed to have wards, and must elect all their councillors on a general vote of the whole municipality—which is a very good thing, as far as it goes. Then, when we come to towns with more than five thousand of a population, and cities of fifteen thousand or less, we find that if they want to abolish their wards they must do it by a referendum vote, thus:

4. The Council of any town having a population of more than 5,000, and of any city having a population of 15,000 or less, may by a by-law provide that the Council of such town or city shall be composed of a Mayor and of one alderman for each 1,000 of population, to be elected by general vote; but such by-law must be submitted to a vote of the electors before it can come into force. (61 Vic., chap. 23, sec. 2.)

None of the foregoing provisions affect the Councils for the current year, 1898.

MEETING APPROVAL.

That the foregoing legislation is meeting with popular approval is shown by the steps which are being taken to give it effect.

Chatham, Peterboro', Lindsay, Belleville, Brantford and Owen Sound have all taken referendum votes on ward abolition bylaws. Brantford is the only place where the electors sustained the ward system. In the other five places named, the bylaws were passed and the wards abolished. Other municipalities are taking similiar action.

ONLY A STEP.

Whilst the abolition of the wards is a large step towards a reasonable and proper system of voting, yet it is only a step. Those who earnestly desire really good municipal government will be bitterly disappointed if they rely on the mere abolition of the wards to bring

about that result. In itself, we cannot expect much from this measure. But combined with the Hare system of Proportional Representation, it would open a wide door to the best and wisest developments of modern municipal government.

Let us then accept this legislation as an instalment of Proportional Representation, and work persistently to get the further step which is necessary. That step is a change in the method of voting.

MULTIPLE VOTING.

The ordinary way of voting is by the "multiple vote," that is, each voter has as many votes as there are councillors to be elected. In a city electing ten aldermen, each elector has ten votes; so that if a thousand electors go to the polls, something under ten thousand votes will be cast, because the full franchise is not ordinarily used by every voter. Then the ten candidates having the highest number of votes are declared elected.

This method of voting is so universal that it has all the force of law, although a layman's search in the statutes has failed to discover any enactment of the plan. Perhaps some friendly lawyer will throw more light on this point. Meanwhile, let us turn a searchlight upon the multiple vote, and we shall find it a very poor tool by which to construct a good municipal council.

MONOPOLY OF REPRESENTATION.

The multiple vote favors a monopoly of representation. That is the first defect that we find, and it is a pretty bad one. Keeping to our illustration of ten aldermen elected by a thousand voters, see this:

If 501 voters unite on six candidates those 501 voters can elect the whole of the city council, and leave the other 499 voters without any representation at all.

"Oh, that is an extreme illustration," say you. Quite so. Although entirely correct, it is not likely to occur just in that form. Let us then take an illustration which is very likely to occur, where politics are introduced into municipal affairs; and we will take it in round numbers, which are more easily grasped.

If six hundred voters unite on a ticket of ten candidates, they can elect the whole council, and the other four hundred voters will not be able to elect anybody to represent them.

Each of these six hundred voters has ten votes, and this enables them to place their ten candidates in the ten places at the top of the poll, by giving each candidate about six hundred votes. The remaining four hundred electors may unite on another ticket if they like, but they are powerless. They can only give each of their candidates four hundred votes, so that these are all placed below the candidates of the six hundred.

Consequently, these four hundred voters are disfranchised and unrepresented, although being two-fifths of the electorate, they are entitled to elect four out of the ten councillors. Is that fair, or even decent? You know it is not.

POLITICS ENCOURAGED.

The foregoing illustration is a very moderate one, and affords ample margin to allow for scattering votes and for the introduction of independent candidates.

Where general politics are rampant in municipal matters, and the two parties are pretty evenly divided, the party tickets will sweep the vote, and independent candidates will get very few votes, because your average voter hates to throw away his vote on a man with a slim chance.

Here we put our finger on one disadvantage of abolishing the wards without providing a better plan of voting. It offers a strong inducement to introduce general politics into municipal affairs. This disadvantage is offset by getting rid of narrow ward politics and by the election of larger men; but it is there all the same.

A SURE REMEDY.

How would the Hare plan of Proportional Representation work in the above case? It simply renders impossible such a result as we have pointed out.

The six hundred electors, having practically only one vote each, have to divide their votes amongst the candidates they want, and cannot therefore elect more than six. This would allow the four hundred to elect the four aldermen that they are entitled to. A short study of the Hare system will show how this works out.

TAKING CHANCES.

Another grave objection to the multiple vote is that it mixes and muddles things, and brings in a large element of chance. It is something like throwing dice. There is no telling which side will come to the top. Many curious combinations of the ten-fold vote take place. Monopolization of all the representatives by a mere majority of the voters may result from the inherent cussedness of the method itself, and not from a deliberate or organized attempt on the part of the majority.

A ONE-TENTH INTEREST.

Then, instead of your being represented in a clear and definite way by one distinct alderman in the council, you have, so to speak, only a one-tenth interest in ten different aldermen, who are persons necessarily of diverse views and opinions on some subjects that you are interested in. Which idea of representation is most in accord with common sense?

AS MUCH VOTING POWER.

Some persons have the idea that a man's voting power is lessened by giving him only one vote instead of ten. This is a fallacy. When everybody else has ten votes as well as you, your additional votes are swamped and neutralized by the additional votes of the other fellows; so that you get all the disadvantages of the multiple vote without any increase of your voting power.

MAJORITY AND MINORITY.

It is sometimes said, "Oh, the majority must govern." But to apply that remark to an election is to suffer from confusion of thought. Representation is one thing; government and legislation is another. First get a fair representation of the voters, in your council, then let a majority of the representatives decide when it comes to a decision, Yes or No, on any measure. And there is much to be done in any governing or executive body besides the mere Yes and No vote. An intelligent minority of representatives has great weight and influence; its voice can be heard; it can fully and fairly present the views of the voters whom it represents; and it can watch the majority and keep them straight if need be. These things are the clear rights of the minority, and they are denied by the use of the multiple vote.

THE GOLDEN RULE.

Take another illustration. A hundred voters in the city are particularly desirous to have a certain man—say Mr. Smith—in the council. The other nine hundred are indifferent or hostile to Smith, or prefer somebody else. These one hundred voters are one-tenth of the electorate, and therefore they are en-

titled by right to one-tenth of the representation; that is, to one alderman out of the ten. Under the multiple vote they are deprived of that right; that is, they are disfranchised—deprived of their voting power. Under Proportional Representation any candidate having a hundred votes would be elected. Under the multiple vote, there is a tyrannous usurpation by the majority.

THE UNIT OF REPRESENTATION.

It may be asked, Why have not one-twelfth of the voters a right to independent representation, as well as one-tenth? Because only ten members are being elected, and the right of such representation is limited by the number of members. If twelve members were being elected, then one-twelfth of the voters would have the right to independently elect one member. They would then be what is called "the Unit of Representation."

The case we are taking is an election in which the unit of representation is one-tenth of the electors. Although in this case a smaller number cannot elect their own particular man, yet the Proportional vote gives them considerable latitude of choice otherwise, as anyone well knows who is familiar with the Hare system.

WASTED VOTES.

The plan of multiple voting causes a great waste of votes, because so many are thrown away on defeated candidates. The larger the number of candidates, the greater is likely to be the wasted votes.

Take as an example the Toronto municipal election of January, 1898. In each of six wards four aldermen were elected by a multiple or general vote; on exactly the same plan as the four councillors of a township or village. Here are the figures for three of the wards, which give a fair sample:

Third ward—Total vote for successful candidates, eight thousand; for defeated candidates, over seven thousand. Only 56 per cent. of the votes—a little more than half—elected all the aldermen! thus wasting 44 per cent. This is about the average.

Fifth ward—Nearly seven thousand votes for winning candidates, and nearly four thousand votes for the losing ones. This ward showed the least waste of any, yet the effective votes were only 62 per cent. and the lost votes were 38 per cent.

Sixth ward—This is the worst showing of the lot. The elected aldermen received over 3,500 votes, whilst the defeated candidates got over four thousand votes! So that the aldermen in this ward were elected by a minority of the votes, or 47 per cent. The majority of the votes, amounting to 53 per cent., were thrown away on defeated candidates.

Is it not time that we changed a method so stupid as to render such things possible? No such results could follow the Hare system.

CHAPTER III.

A PRETTY FAIR TOWN ELECTION.

Some Particulars Thereof, Showing How the Citizens of the Town of Prettyfair Elected Their Nine Councillors, How John Smith Marked His Ballot and How Mr. Countwell Did His Work.

Come with me to the good colony of South Australia, and look with prophetic eye upon the first election under the Hare-Spence Proportional Voting System in the illustrative town of Prettyfair.

The people of the town naturally felt a keen interest in this first election, and there was an exceptionally strong list of candidates. Some of the best citizens of the town had allowed themselves to be put in nomination.

The local newspapers had thoroughly explained the new system, abundance of official placards had been posted, and there had been a good deal of talk; so that even the most illiterate of the electors understood pretty well how to vote.

The candidates for a seat in the council numbered fourteen; nine of whom were to be elected for the whole town; the ward system having been abolished. The names of these fourteen candidates were on one official ballot. Each voter was instructed to mark nine names, or fewer, with the figures 1, 2, 3, etc., in the order of his choice, and was also told that his vote would only count for one man. As a sample, here is a ballot which was cast by a voter whom we will call John Smith. It will also serve to show the names of the candidates:

JOHN SMITH'S BALLOT.

A. B. Backbone	4
C. Buzzer	7
D. E. Clearcut	5
F. Goodbar	
G. H. Jawsmith	8
I. Noeshow	
J. K. Singletaks	2
L. Sydewaux	1
M. Swiveltop	9
O. P. Square	3
Q. Tenpercent	
R. Tippelknot	6
S. T. Vakantlot	
W. Windigasser	

What is the meaning of this ballot? Well, it means that John Smith says: "The man of my first choice is Mr. L. Sydewaux; so I mark him No. 1, and I want my vote to count for him if he needs it. But if he has enough ballots to elect him without mine, or if he has no chance of being elected, then I want my vote to count for J. K. Singletaks, whom I have marked No. 2. If Singletaks does not need my vote, then it is to count for Mr. Square, marked No. 3; and so on, down to Swiveltop, No. 9 if necessary to go so far."

Mr. Countwell had been appointed returning officer. When the polls closed and the counting of the votes began, Mr. Countwell described each step in the process for the benefit of a large audience which was present by arrangement to see the working of the new plan.

After a few preliminary remarks, Mr. Countwell said: "The first step is to sort all the ballots in accordance with the names that are marked first-choice upon them, paying no heed to the other figures.

"This has already been done in the various polling sub-divisions, and I have before me the packages of ballots sorted in this way, which have been sent to me, together with a tally or statement, from each sub-division.

"I have also before me fourteen files or compartments labelled with the names of the fourteen candidates, one file for each candidate. I proceed to sort the packages of ballots into these compartments, untying each as I do so. Thus I bring together, into the compartment of each candidate, all the No. 1 votes that have been given to him in all the subdivisions. Whilst I am doing this, my two tally-clerks are adding up the tallies which have been sent from the sub-divisions."

On the completion of this process Mr. Countwell said: "I find that there have been 1,245 good ballots cast; that is the total. Dividing that number by nine, the number of councillors required to be elected, I find that a 'quota' of 138 votes is required to elect any one candidate. Now the following first-choice votes have been given.

Backbone	153
Tippelknot	150
Goodbar	149
Windigasser	105
Singletaks	95
Clearcut	94
Sydewaux	89
Jawsmith	82
Buzzer..	80
Square	75
Vakantlot	50
Tenpercent	49
Swiveltop	44
Noeshow	30
Total 1,245	

"Messrs. Backbone, Tippelknot and Goodbar have each more than a quota of 138 votes, and I therefore declare them duly elected. (Cheers and counter cheers.) I shall now proceed to put aside the quota of these three gentlemen, and to distribute their surplus ballots.

"Mr. Backbone has fifteen more ballots than he requires; Mr. Tippelknot twelve; and Mr. Goodbar eleven. I count fifteen ballots from the top of Mr. Backbone's pile, and seal up the remaining 138, marking the latter 'Backbone's quota.' These are the votes which have elected Mr. Backbone. I then take his fifteen surplus ballots, and distribute them into the compartments of the candidates not yet elected. The first one which I take up is marked 'Backbone, 1; Clearcut, 2.' I put the ballot on Mr. Clearcut's file, and that counts him a vote. The next ballot I take up is marked 'Backbone, 1; Goodbar, 2; Windigasser, 3.' As Mr. Goodbar is already elected, he does not need this vote, so I pass him over, and put the ballot on Mr. Windigasser's pile. I distribute all of Mr. Backbone's surplus votes on the same principle.

"Then I seal up the quota of Mr. Tippelknot and distribute his surplus ballots in a similar manner. The same is done in the case of Mr. Goodbar.

"I find that the distribution of these surplus ballots has not yet increased the votes for any other candidate enough to elect him. I shall, therefore, begin at the other end. Mr. Noeshow is at the bottom of the poll with 30 first-choice votes. He cannot be elected; so I take all his ballots and distribute them amongst the candidates who are marked next choice thereon.

"Still no one else gets a quota, so I take Mr. Swiveltop's ballots and distribute them in the same way. Mr. Windigasser is marked second choice on many of these ballots. I am not yet through with them, but the chief

tally clerk tells me that Mr. Windigasser has now a quota, so I stop the distribution in order to declare Mr. Windigasser elected, and to seal up his quota. (Great cheering from the friends of Mr. Windigasser.) I then resume the distribution of Mr. Swiveltop's surplus, but its conclusion does not bring another quota."

We need not follow Mr. Countwell any further in these details, for it would only lead to repetition. It will be sufficient to give the general course of the counting as it affected the respective candidates. Tenpercent and Vakantlot being next at the bottom of the poll, were successively cut off, with the result of giving a quota each to Singletalks, Clearcut and Sydewaux. Two more councillors were yet wanted, and the only candidates left were Jawsmith, Buzzer and Square, none of whom had a quota. On the first count Square had been below the other two, but enough votes were transferred to him subsequently to place him considerably ahead of both the others, thus showing him to be more solidly grounded in popular favor. Jawsmith, however, kept his lead on Buzzer, so Square and Jawsmith were declared elected, as coming nearest to a quota.

The assembled people of Prettyfair passed a hearty vote of thanks to Mr. Countwell for the ability with which he had handled the ballots and made the explanations. As they dispersed many remarks were made about the accurate way in which the new council appeared to reflect the public opinion of the town upon leading issues.

FURTHER POINTERS.

Although in the form of a story the foregoing has been written so as to show in detail the working of the Hare-Spence system, and will repay a careful study.

In the event of a tie in eliminating candidates, the one having the figure "1" on his ballots the least number of times should be eliminated. If the tied candidates are equal in this respect, then eliminate the one having the figure "2" the least number of times, and so on in regular numerical order.

This is on the principle that when it comes to a tie a transferred ballot is not as good as an original first-choice, nor a third-choice as good as a second, and so on.

When the tied candidates are equal in the above respect, then the casting of lots must be resorted to, or the decision may be left with the returning officer.

If the seat of any member shall become vacant before the next election, then the unsuccessful candidate having the highest number of votes shall succeed to the vacant position.

CHAPTER IV.

THE HARE-SPENCE VOTING SYSTEM.

Its Able and Eminent Advocates—Where it is Used in Actual Elections—Proportional Representation in Tasmania, Switzerland, San Francisco and Elsewhere -- Objections Stated and Answered—Large and Small Elections.

Having got a pretty clear idea of the principle and operation of the Hare-Spence system of Proportional Representation, the practical reader will be asking some questions. Is this system in actual use anywhere? To what extent has it been tested in practice? Has it been endorsed by any persons of prominence? What objections have been brought against it, and what the answers thereto?

We shall proceed to reply to these queries.

First, a few words as to its history. It was originally proposed by Thomas Hare, a barrister, of old London, about forty years ago. It has been modified by Miss Catherine Helen Spence, an able speaker and writer of South Australia, who has popularized the system in that colony, and done much to promote its adoption elsewhere.

In England, many persons of distinction have endorsed the Hare idea. Amongst them are John Stuart Mill, Millicent Garrett Fawcett, Sir John Lubbock, Sir Leonard Courtney, and many others.

In Canada, Sir Sandford Fleming has interested himself in the general question of Proportional Representation. In 1892 he published a work of nearly two hundred pages, dealing with the question. John Idington, Q.C., of Stratford, is also interested, and has expressed himself publicly in favor of the Hare-Spence system.

In the United States, the American Proportional Representation League was founded in 1893, including a score of well-known names, such as those of Hon. Samuel B. Capen, of Boston; Professor Felix Adler, of New York; Hon. James G. Maguire, of San Francisco; and Professor John R. Commons, of the Indiana University—the last named of whom has written a book on the subject. Most able and successful practical propaganda work has been done by Alfred Cridge, of 429 Montgomery street, San Francisco, who is a strong advocate of the Hare system, and an expert authority thereon.

Now for instances of practical working tests. These are numerous, and a few of the more prominent will suffice.

In the British colony of Tasmania, on January 20th, 1897, ten members were elected to Parliament by means of the Hare system, being six from the city of Hobart, and four from Launceston. A bill providing for the use of the Hare system in these two cities had been introduced in the Lower House by Hon. A. I. Clark, then Attorney-General, and passed, but was thrown out by the Upper House. Finally, the Upper House assented to the bill on the express condition that the Hare system should be used only for the one election, in each of the cities named. After the elections a pamphlet was published by Mr. R. M. Johnston, F.L.S., Government Statistician of Tasmania, in

which he analysed the election operations in Hobart and Launceston, and highly commended the working of the Hare system. There was also much favorable comment in newspapers and otherwise.

In the republic of Switzerland, ten of the cantons elect their legislative representatives by means of a system of Proportional Representation known as the Swiss Free List. The number of cantons using this system has grown steadily during late years.

The three cases cited are of Legislative or Parliamentary elections. The present writer is not aware of any actual municipal use of the Hare system, but two cases that come nearest to it are the English school boards and the San Francisco Mechanics' Institute.

In England, the governing bodies of the public schools have for more than twenty years been elected by a plan of approximate proportional representation, known as cumulative voting. This, although better than the ordinary multiple method, is a crude and defective plan. Its adoption is probably one strong reason why proportional representation has not made more headway in England.

The case of the Mechanics' Institute of San Francisco is one which comes very near to municipal conditions. Every year its membership elects a governing board of seven trustees, and the voters vary from about eight hundred to a thousand in number. Therefore the election is not unlike that of a small town governed by a Town Council of seven members. For six successive years the Mechanics' Institute has elected its trustees by the Hare-Spence system, with entire success and complete satisfaction.

A growing number of smaller organizations use the proportional plan in their elections. A Toronto example of this is the Trades and Labor Council.

We now turn to objections and their answers. Only one point is the subject of vigorous attack, namely, the method of transferring ballots from those candidates who have a surplus. These are taken at random from the top of the pile, the ballots having previously been thoroughly mixed. It is urged that if other ballots had been taken the result might have been different, and that an important part of the process of counting ought not to be left to mere chance.

On the face of it, this objection has weight, and we will deal with it somewhat fully.

1. The law of chances is strongly in favor of a fair average sample of second choices coming to the top; and the larger the election the greater is the probability. A pertinent illustration is given by Mr. Alfred Cridge, thus: Put five hundred marbles, one hundred of each of five colors, in a bag; shake them all up; then take out fifty haphazard and the probabilities are that there will be about ten of each color in the fifty. Put fifty thousand marbles, ten thousand of each color, and mix them similarly. The probabilities then become nearly overwhelming that if you take out five hundred at random there will be fifty of each. This difference between large and small elections is important to note, because small elections at meetings are a valuable means of diffusing a knowledge of Proportional Representation. Where the voters are very few, it is well for each to vote in duplicate or perhaps triplicate—that is, each voter to put in two or sometimes even three ballots—which gives the same advantage in counting as if there were twice or three times the number of voters.

2. In an average municipal election the chances are overwhelming against any candidate being prejudiced by taking the surplus at random. Mr. Cridge made a careful analysis of the 853 ballots cast in the Mechanics' Institute at

the 1894 election. He made various distributions of the surplus, including one distribution that was mathematically proportionate and exact. The result was the same, in each case, as it had been at the election.

3. The really important transfer of votes is that from candidates at the bottom of the poll, whose votes have to be all distributed, so that the element of chance does not enter there. These votes are usually much more numerous than the surplus votes, and sometimes there are no surplus votes at all.

4. Granting for the sake of argument the fullest possible force to this "chance" objection, the Hare system is yet so much superior to the ordinary method that the merits of the system far outweigh its drawbacks, and that is really the point.

5. Finally, there are two methods by which surplus ballots may be distributed with mathematical accuracy, by any person familiar with the common rules of arithmetic as far as fractions or the "rule of three." One of these was used at the Tasmanian Parliamentary elections already mentioned; and the other is used by Miss Spence in South Australia.

"Oh! why, then, make so exhaustive a defence of the 'chance' method?"

Simply because it takes less time and trouble, and we believe it to be good enough for all practical purposes.

"Does not the counting of votes take a very long time in the Hare system?"

No. At the San Francisco Mechanics' Institute in 1896, the votes cast were 958 in number, and the count was completed in two hours and fifteen minutes. That is good enough.

"Would it not be inconvenient and perhaps dangerous to have the ballots brought to one central point to complete the counting?"

Not usually. The tally of first-choice votes can be telephoned from the polling sub-divisions, so as to check the figures sent by messengers. If difficulty appears in an exceptional case, the Gove system can be used. We shall describe it later.

CHAPTER V.

PUBLIC INDIFFERENCE IN ELECTIONS.

Thoughtful men deplore the widespread carelessness and indifference to good municipal government, manifested especially at election time, when one would suppose that every good citizen would take time and trouble in an important public matter, instead of having to be persistently canvassed by candidates and their agents, and perhaps coaxed to go to the polls.

Various superficial and penal remedies have been proposed, amongst them Compulsory Voting and the legal Abolition of Canvassing. Such methods are objectionable and inefficient.

GET TO THE ROOT OF IT.

But what are we to do? Is there no way of curing these evils?

Certainly there is. For every wrong act there is a motive. When the wrong act is a common thing amongst many respectable people, then there must be an underlying motive common to all these people, which leads them to act as they do. To find out and remove that motive, and to supply a stimulus in the opposite direction, is far better than your prohibitions and pains and penalties. It is the old story that prevention is better than cure—especially when the cure does not cure.

What, then, is the motive, the reason, for public indifference at municipal elections? Its root is in a system which restricts the choice of the elector to candidates that he does not care about, or gives him occasionally the privilege of throwing away his vote on a man he is interested in, but who cannot be elected. No wonder the voters are indifferent. Let us remove stupid obstacles to their doing the right thing before we try to punish them for not doing it.

UNDER A COMMON SENSE PLAN.

Consider the effect of a reasonable and proper system of election.

Take as an illustration a city governed by a council of nine aldermen, elected by proportional representation every year from the city at large, the ward boundaries being abolished. Those aldermen would be elected in such a way that one-ninth of the electors, from all over the city, could elect one alderman.

See the wide freedom of choice! Instead of half-a-dozen ward candidates, sixteen or eighteen men of wide reputation, known from one end of the city to the other. Amongst these there would surely be some one man whose candidature would strongly rouse your interest, and for whom you would make a point of recording your single vote. Perhaps he might be a supporter of some reform that you believe in; perhaps advocating some special city improvements that you wanted; perhaps a man so well and favorably known that you would be glad to support him; perhaps even a personal friend of yours, but not living in your particular political "pen"—the old ward. Little matter what, so long as you, the voter, had a wide choice to rouse your interest.

Then, the grand feeling of an efficient ballot, the knowledge that your vote would tell—would be a real factor in the contest—would count either for someone you wanted or against someone you did not want! This feeling would come from marking nine candidates in the order of

your choice, so that if your favorite candidate did not need your vote, it would not be thrown away, but would count for someone else.

Besides, the calibre of the candidates would be greatly improved, because they would have to be favorably known throughout the city, not with mere ward reputation.

THE CANVASSING OF VOTERS.

As to canvassing, the motive and necessity for it would be largely removed by the abolition of the ward system, and the introduction of Proportional Representation; because each candidate would appeal to that group or quota of the electors, spread over the whole city, who were in accord with his ideas; and it would be a difficult, almost impracticable, thing, to tramp the whole city, or hire men to do it, and pick out the particular one-ninth of the voters on whom he could rely for election. Appeal by printed addresses on the grounds of principle and character would then be the principal factor; whilst the factor of personal persuasion would become of little value. That is a better way of abolishing canvassing than by prohibition with pains and penalties.

PUBLIC INTEREST IN ELECTIONS.

It is not easy to overestimate the necessity and importance of public interest in elections, because this is a vital matter. But the way to do right is to begin rightly—on a right foundation.

What we have said about the benefits of ward abolition and effective voting applies to nearly every city, town and village on this continent. Everywhere there is reason for the same complaint of indifference to elections, and difficulty of getting the right men elected. Everywhere the cause is the same faulty method of election, which restricts the choice of voters, prevents their uniting to get the men they want, places a premium on mediocre ward politicians and straddlers, and shuts out radical advocates of social and municipal reform. There must be a strong public interest and even enthusiasm in elections before we have good municipal government.

To rouse that interest permanently there is but one way: the adoption of Proportional Representation, which has well been called Effective Voting. And the first step in this direction is in many cases the advocacy of the Initiative and Referendum, which is a good thing in itself, and, if in force, would give a sure means of getting Proportional Representation when a majority of the people understood the value and desired the adoption of this latter reform.

CHAPTER VI.

THE "INITIATIVE" AS A LEVER.

Proportional Representation being a good thing, how are the people to get it? What are the ways and means by which it may be enacted into statute law?

To answer these questions, we must look into another and a kindred reform, known as "Direct Legislation by the Initiative and Referendum." This title is long and formidable, but the thing itself is so simple and straightforward that we can describe it in a few short paragraphs.

ITS GENERAL SCOPE.

1. Direct Legislation is law-making by the voters.

2. The initiative means that if a certain percentage of qualified voters petition for any measure, it must be submitted to a popular vote, and that it must become law if it gains a majority of such vote. Five per cent. of the voters is about the right percentage, and it should not be higher than ten per cent. Too low a percentage involves the risk of expense in needless or frivolous votes. Too high a percentage renders the law inefficient and practically inoperative.

3. The Referendum is a mandatory vote by the people on a proposed law, yes or no. By "mandatory" we mean that it compels the enactment of that law if the majority votes yes. This is the great difference between a Referendum and a Plebiscite, because the Plebiscite compels nothing.

4. There are two main forms of the Referendum. One is a vote of the people on a measure proposed by an Initiative petition, as already referred to. The other is a yes or no vote on acts passed by the Legislature—usually limited to certain classes of acts.

ITS MUNICIPAL APPLICATION.

The foregoing paragraphs cover the general scope of the Initiative and Referendum, but our present concern is with its municipal application, more especially in the Province of Ontario, and particularly as a means of obtaining important reforms such as Proportional Representation.

The people of this province have already a large measure of the referendum. The voters of every municipality are familiar with the idea of submitting municipal by-laws to a popular vote. Every such vote is a referendum. But the scope of this popular power is too limited, and its usefulness is narrowed by the absence of a general provision permitting and giving force to initiative petitions.

Yet the initiative is not wholly absent from the provincial legislation which creates and controls our Ontario municipalities. A partial search in the bulky Revised Statutes of 1897 has discovered the following three instances; all in chapter 223, which is known as the Municipal Act.

INITIATIVE IN ONTARIO.

When an unincorporated village and its neighborhood contains 750 inhabitants, and certain other conditions exist, then the County Council shall incorporate it on the petition of not less than a hundred resident freeholders and tenants. R.S.O., chap. 223, section 11. This is a mandatory initiative without any referendum.

Again, a petition signed by 150 qualified electors of any town or village, asking for annexation to an adjacent town or village, compels the council to submit a by-law for that purpose to the electors. (Revised Statutes, Ontario, chapter 223, section 26, sub-section 4.) This is the initiative followed by a referendum. The number of petitioners is a fixed one, so that the percentage is high for a small village, and low for a large town.

The third instance we mentioned is in section 71, sub-section 2. It provides for an initiative of 100 electors, followed by a referendum, and is in relation to the repeal of a by-law fixing the number of municipal councillors in town wards, the details of which I need not trouble you with.

Then the recent Municipal Amendment Act provides as follows: In a town of not more than five thousand population, if twenty per cent. of the electors petition for a by-law dividing the town into wards, the Town Council must submit the proposition to the electors, and it goes into effect if a majority of the electors vote yes. (61 Vict., chap. 23, section 2, sub-section 2.) This is the initiative and referendum again. The percentage is very high, evidently because the Legislature thought the "general vote" a good thing, and wanted to discourage a division of the town into wards. But it shows how easy it is to enact the initiative in an inefficient form, whether with a good or bad object, because to get a petition signed by twenty per cent. of the electors is in most cases so hard and expensive a job as to be almost prohibitory.

GOOD PRECEDENTS.

There, therefore, exist good precedents for the use of the municipal initiative, followed by a referendum. What is required is a wider extension of the principle, either in a general way, or as applied to particular matters. One direct benefit would certainly follow, the rousing of a stronger interest in municipal affairs. Each elector would increasingly feel that he had influence as a factor in the government of his municipality.

TESTING REFORMS.

The initiative affords the least objectionable method of testing proposed reforms in municipal government. A few progressive citizens become convinced of the value of a reform, and willing to take the responsibility of asking their fellow citizens to put it into operation. They prove their sincerity by taking the time and trouble of circulating the necessary initiative petition. If they can convince a reasonable percentage of the electors that the reform is one which ought to be tried, then it goes to the referendum, in order to receive the sanction of a majority of the electors. This sanction being given, the reform goes into effect—or rather, is put on trial, because the same power that enacted it can repeal it.

Valuable experiments in municipal government may thus be put to the conclusive test of practical experience. The Provincial Legislature would rightly object to compel municipalities to try experiments or introduce suggested reforms, but surely the citizens of a progressive municipality should have the power to do this if they wish. The door would thus be opened to progress in good municipal government.

Progress must be mainly along the line of experiment. How can people find out whether a theory is good unless they are allowed to try it? First theory, then experimental practice, then adoption—these are the three upward steps to better things.

CHAPTER VII.

ELECTING A MAYOR OR REEVE.

How to Secure a Clear Majority With One Balloting When Several Candidates are in the Field—Adaptation of the Hare System to the Election of a Single Officer.

Let us clearly realize the distinction in principle between the election of councillors and the election of a single officer, such as a mayor. In the former case, the object is to represent all the voters, as nearly as you can come at it. In the second case, the main point is that the man elected should have a clear majority of the votes cast, and should not be elected by a minority.

So far as the election itself is concerned, the ordinary system of voting for single officers is all right when only two candidates run for each office, but where three or more candidates are running, the successful one may be, and often is, elected by a minority of the voters—which is not right.

Another disadvantage of the present method is that it restricts the choice of candidates. When two fairly strong men are nominated, others dislike to enter the field, because they might injure the chances of one or other of the candidates by cutting into his vote, and because many electors will not vote for a man, however good, unless they think he is one of the strongest candidates.

Organizations such as political conventions take several ballots in order ultimately to secure a majority. The friends of the weaker candidates give up the man of their first choice and cast their votes for the one they like next best; and the process is continued until some one gets a clear majority. But this plan is open to serious objection. It consumes much time, and tends to log-rolling and other evils. The order of the voter's preference for the candidate ought to be fixed at the time of the first votes, not left to subsequent influences.

In several European countries what is called the second ballot is in force; that is, that when there are three or more candidates, and none of them gets a clear majority of the whole vote cast, there must be a second election.

These roundabout and expensive methods are needless. There is a simple and scientific way of getting a majority by one balloting. Use the "elimination" feature of the Hare system, as follows:

Suppose that Smith, Brown, Jones and Robinson are running for a city mayoralty. Each voter marks his ballot for all the candidates in the order in which he prefers them. For instance, take a voter who wants Smith to be elected and who thinks Robinson the most objectionable of the candidates, and who prefers Brown to Jones. The voter will mark his ballot thus:

Brown.....	2
Jones.....	3
Robinson.....	4
Smith.....	1

At the close of the poll the votes are sorted out according to the "number one" votes for each candidate. Then

the candidate who has the smallest number of these first-choice votes is declared "out of the count," and his ballots are distributed amongst the other three candidates in accordance with the second-choices thereon—that is, the names marked "2."

Then the lowest of these three remaining candidates is eliminated, as was the fourth, and his ballots are similarly transferred. Then whichever of the remaining two is found to have the greatest number of votes, transferred or original, is declared elected.

An illustration will show how fully the voter's choice is given effect to: Suppose that when the ballots are sorted, Smith is at the bottom of the poll with the smallest number of first-choice votes. The voter whose ballot is shown above cannot have his vote count for Smith, because Smith is "out of it;" but the ballot is still effective to give a lift to Brown, the man whom the voter likes better than Jones and Robinson, and for whom he would have voted if Smith had not been running. Then suppose Brown be eliminated, our voter's ballot is "not dead yet"; it still takes a hand in, by counting one for Jones and against Robinson, the man most objected to by our voter. Finally the contest is narrowed down to the two best men in the opinion of the majority of the voters; and the better of these two men gets it by a clear majority.

In the British colony of Queensland, the law provides that the above system is to be used in Parliamentary elections when there are more than two candidates for the seat in a single-member district.

You will notice how the foregoing plan favors the full and free choice of the electors, by encouraging the nomination of more than two candidates. In the illustration above given, Smith's friends are not afraid to give him their first-choice votes, because they know that this will not injure the chances of any other candidate if Smith cannot be elected. They know that in that event their votes will go to a stronger candidate whom they have marked as next or next choice on their ballots.

To ensure a clear majority in every case, it is desirable to have a rule that any voter who does not mark every candidate on his ballot with the numbers signifying his preference, will spoil his ballot—or rather, every candidate except one, because it would be understood that the one omitted candidate was intended to be the last of the lot. It will perhaps be objected that this might lead to a good many spoiled ballots. The obvious answer is that the spoiled ballots would be those of the least intelligent and least desirable class of voters—those who were too indifferent or too dull to understand the system under which they were exercising their franchise. Such a voter does a service to the public by spoiling his ballot.



APPENDIX.

I.—SOME MATHEMATICAL METHODS.

When showing how to distribute the surplus votes of candidates in elections under the Hare system, we mentioned two other methods by which the surplus could be distributed with mathematical accuracy. These we will now briefly describe, commencing with the method invented by Miss Martin, of South Australia, and taking as an illustration the case of a meeting-room election in which forty ballots are cast for the election of five committeemen, so that anyone having a quota of eight votes is elected.

MISS MARTIN'S METHOD.

The quota being eight, suppose that Smith gets sixteen first-choice votes. What then? Smith cannot possibly use more than eight votes, yet he has received sixteen. Eight is half of sixteen, so that Smith can only use half of his total vote. And if he can only use half his total vote, then he can only use half of each ballot taken separately. Therefore, on each separate ballot, half the voting power of the voter is available for the candidate whom the voter has marked as his second choice on that particular ballot.

In other words, each ballot gives half a vote to Smith and half a vote to the No. 2 man on it. Do you see the point?

Smith gets sixteen of these half votes, which is the same as eight whole votes, making his quota; and the other sixteen half votes form the surplus to be distributed. It is done in this way:

After declaring Smith duly elected, the returning officer takes Smith's sixteen ballots and marks each of them "1-2" with a colored pencil. The sixteen ballots are then distributed amongst the candidates who are marked second choice upon them. Any candidate getting two of these "1-2" ballots will be credited with one complete vote.

Now for a simple rule which will apply this principle to all sorts of surpluses, big and little. It is this:

Take the candidate's surplus and his total vote, and make a fraction of them, with the surplus for the top half of the fraction, and the total vote for the bottom half. Then reduce the fraction to its lowest terms by means of a "common divisor," which every schoolboy understands. Take all the ballots of the candidate, mark the fraction on each of them, and distribute them all as above directed.

Applying this to the case of Smith's sixteen ballots, the process is this:

Surplus, eight.
Total ballots, sixteen.
Fraction, eight-sixteenths.
Common divisor, eight.
Reduced fraction, one-half.
Each ballot counts 1-2 a vote for whoever is second choice in it.

Take another example. Suppose Smith had ten votes, the quota being eight. Eight from ten gives his surplus. Then the process is this:

Surplus two.
Total ballots, ten.
Fraction, two-tenths.
Common division, two.
Reduced fraction, one-fifth.
Each ballot counts one-fifth of a vote for the second choice on it, and it takes five of these transferred ballots to make one complete vote.

Now, take a complicated looking instance. If Smith has eleven votes, the quota still being eight, his surplus would be three. Then we have this process:

Surplus, three.
Total ballots, eleven.
Fraction, three-elevenths.
Common divisor, none.
Fraction cannot be reduced.
Each ballot therefore counts three-elevenths of a vote, and they count this way for the second choices:
Four ballots, one vote.
Eight ballots, two votes.
Eleven ballots, three votes.

You see that the surplus does not amount to much in these last instances. The only disadvantage I can see in this plan is that the tally-sheets have to be made a little larger, so as to leave room for putting down the fractions, and the tally clerks would have to be familiar with fractional addition. They may use decimals if they like. It would be well to have space left at the left hand of the names in which the fractions could be jotted down as called out, and then added together before being transferred to the body of the tally-sheet.

THE TASMANIAN METHOD.

At the last parliamentary election in Tasmania, the returning officer, assisted by the Government statistician, adopted a method similar in principle to the above, but differing in practice.

The Tasmanian plan is briefly this: A rule of-three-sum is worked out in the case of each second-choice candidate who is on the ballots of the man having a surplus.

Suppose that Mr. Smith has a surplus, and that several different candidates are marked second choice on his ballots, Mr. Brown being one of these. Then the rule of three-sum in Brown's case would be this:

As Smith's total vote is to second choices for Brown, so Smith's surplus is to the votes Brown should get.

We desire merely to give an idea of this plan, without going into detail, because it is not as well adapted to small elections as Miss Martin's ingenious method.

EXCEPTIONAL CASES.

Bear in mind that all this mathematical exactitude is really only needed for very exceptional cases. Taking the average election, the usual method of distributing the surplus by chance would work out the same result. But the study is an interesting one; and it is well to be able to show an objector that there are mathematical methods that can be used.

Apart from actual electoral use, these methods are valuable for analysing small elections that have been conducted on the ordinary Hare system.

The present writer took the ballots of the last election of the Educational Committee of the Trades and Labor Council, and made a recount of them, using Miss Martin's method of distributing the surplus. The result was the same as had been given by the "chance" method in the actual election.

2.—THE GOVE SYSTEM.

Whilst we regard the Hare-Spence system as the best all-round plan of Effective Voting, we desire to give our readers an opportunity to judge of other proposed plans. We therefore present a description of a system proposed by Hon. W. H. Gove, of Salem, Mass., which has been adopted by the Proportional Representation League of the United States as one of the two plans which they recommend.

As applied to municipalities, the Gove system requires wards to be abolished and aldermen or councillors to be elected by a general vote. Its distinctive feature is the way in which votes are transferred from a candidate who has more votes than he needs, or who has too few votes to be of any use.

Under the Gove system each candidate publishes, at a certain time before the election, and in a certain formal way, a list of the candidates to whom he will transfer (1) his surplus votes if he gets more than a quota, or (2) all his votes if he does not get votes enough to be elected. The order of preference of such transfer is determined by the comparative number of votes cast for the others whom he names; that is to say, the man having the largest number of votes on his own account, has the first claim on transferred votes, if he needs them.

It is, therefore, only necessary for the voter to mark one name on his ballot, and the result of the election can be obtained by dealing with statements furn-

ished by the deputy-returning officers from the polling subdivisions, instead of the actual ballots being sent to the returning officer.

Then the process is this:

1. The statements of the deputies are added together, and the total vote for each candidate is ascertained, together with the grand total of the whole vote.

2. The grand total of the whole vote is divided by the number of candidates to be elected. This gives the "quota," or number of votes necessary for election.

3. Any candidate who has a quota or more than a quota is declared elected, and his surplus votes, if any, are transferred to the credit of that man on his published list, not yet elected, who has at this stage the largest number of votes.

4. Anyone getting a quota in this way is declared elected, and no more transferred votes are credited to him. The process is continued until all the surplus votes are transferred to men on the lists who need them.

5. The returning officer then begins at the bottom of the poll. The candidate having the lowest number of votes is declared "out of the count," and all his votes are transferred to those on his list who need them, in the way indicated above.

6. This process is continued by cutting off, one by one, the candidates from the bottom of the poll upwards, until the required number of elected candidates remain. If these have not all a full quota, those who come nearest to it are the chosen ones.

COMMENTS AND COMPARISONS.

The method of working resembles that of the Hare system, and a reading of one plan helps to an understanding of the other.

The Gove system is chiefly objected to on the ground that the candidates determine the transfer of ineffective votes, whereas the voters themselves ought to determine this.

To this objection the answer is that the voter takes into consideration both the candidate and his list of proposed transferees. Those whom a candidate puts on his list are usually men of the same general views as himself, and these are just the persons whom in most cases the voter would chose. The making of an improper list would seriously injure a candidate's chances; whilst the very making of a list is useful information to the voter as to the opinions and affiliations of the cantidate. Also, the voters themselves indirectly decide the order of transference on every candidate's list, because it is the largest number of original votes which gives the first claim to transferred votes, when these are needed to make up a quota.

For meeting-room elections, the Gove system presents difficulties. At illustrative "mock-elections" or "trial ballots," where well-known public men are supposed to be candidates, the lecturer would have the difficult and invidious task of making up a list of transferees for each; whilst at actual elections of committees and delegates some candidates would also find the task an invidious one.

Taking now the manifest advantages of the Gove system, they are these:

The voter has only to mark his ballot for one candidate.

The counting is much quicker and the ballots have not to be taken to a central place to be counted.

Any citizen, when the vote is announced, can figure out the transfer of votes for himself. At every election a thousand checking pencils would prevent even the suspicion of fraud in the transfers.

3.—TWO DEFECTIVE SYSTEMS.

In seeking to decide on an efficient and suitable method of Effective Voting, it is well to know what to avoid. Therefore we give a brief description of two systems which have been adopted in some places, but which are very defective. These are the Cumulative Vote and the Limited Vote. Both of them are operated in districts returning several members.

THE CUMULATIVE VOTE.

Each elector is given as many votes as there are members to be elected. Suppose you are a voter, and seven members are to be elected, then you have seven votes; and you may distribute your votes around in any way you please. You may give all seven of them to one man, or four to one man and three to another, or give one to each of seven candidates. For instance, in a Toronto ward you now have four votes at a municipal election, but you must not cumulate them. If you want to "plump" for a man you can only give him one vote. Under the cumulative system you could give him all your four votes. This is a decided improvement on the present plan, but far behind the systems already described.

The two great objections to Cumulative voting are: (1) That it causes a great waste of votes; and (2) that by careful and thorough organization a majority of the representatives in an electoral district can be got by a minority of the electors. This is done by arranging for certain divisions of voters to vote in such a way that each candidate of that side may have only enough votes to make his election safe. Without this careful and thorough organization the waste of votes is very great. A member requiring only a thousand votes to elect him may have nearly another thousand thrown away on him in order to make his election sure, because the electors do not know how many votes he is going to get.

Speaking generally, it is not well to give several votes to one elector. It really diminishes his voting power, instead of increasing it.

Cumulative voting has been in operaton for more than twenty years in England, in electing members of School Boards. Alfred Cridge thinks that the cause of proportional representation would have made much greater headway in England if this imperfect method had not been in operation.

In the State of Illinois, the Legislature is elected on the cumulative plan from districts returning only three members. Such a burlesque on proportional representation only retards progress.

THE LIMITED VOTE.

The Limited Vote merely gives each elector a few votes less than the number of members to be elected. It was tried for a time in Toronto elections, by giving each elector two votes, whilst three members were to be elected. In New York, seven votes were given, there being twelve members to elect. The plan was abandoned in both places.

4.—ASSOCIATIONS AND SOCIETIES.

Proportional Representation is of much value in the election of the officers and committees of clubs, lodges, friendly societies and similar social and business organizations. It has many advantages over the old method of "multiple voting," the defects of which have already been referred to.

The introduction of proportional representation into such organizations is also one of the most effective means to spread a knowledge of the principle. The question is brought to the front with periodical regularity, and arouses that interest and attention which is usually so difficult to obtain.

Another excellent means of propaganda is to get up a short address on Scientific Suffrage, combined with a mock election on the Hare-Spence plan. You will need the help of some friends, to act as tally-clerks, etc., and you should have three or four rehearsals with a few marked ballots. Choose well-known men or women as your candidates, and call the election one for your municipal council or the legislature, or some other suitable public body. The evening can hardly fail to be a success, because people are almost always interested in an election when they know the candidates. Be sure to explain every step of the process in the clearest way you can.

DOUBLING THE BALLOTS.

The working of the Hare system in "meeting-room elections" may sometimes be unsatisfactory if the number of voters is too small. This difficulty can be entirely obviated by letting each voter mark two separate and distinct ballots, thus doubling the total number of votes. So far as the counting is concerned, this is just as good as if twice the number of voters were present. Usually each voter will mark his two ballots alike—that is, in duplicate; but there is no harm in his varying them if he is undecided which candidate he likes best.

For satisfactory working the number of ballots should not be less than the number of candidates multiplied by itself, thus, for 5 candidates, 25 ballots; 6 candidates 36 ballots; and so on.

A PRACTICAL EXAMPLE.

A novel and interesting application of the methods above recommended was made early in the year by the workmen in the establishment of Wm. & J. G. Greey, mill furnishers, Toronto.

In order to decide the location for the summer picnic, a vote was to be taken amongst the employees. Eighteen different places were to be voted on, and in order to get a clear majority—not a mere plurality—for one particular place, it was decided that the balloting be according to the preferential plan of the Hare system of proportional representation.

The ballots—about eighty in number—were prepared by a suitable duplicating machine, the use of which was got from the office of the firm. Each workman, as he got his time check one morning, received also a blank ballot for the picnic vote, which he marked and returned at noon with his check. The committee counted the ballots the same evening, and although they had no previous knowledge of the Hare system, their work was done very satisfactorily. We print herewith one of the ballots, as a sample, showing the form of ballot and the way of marking:

PICNIC BALLOT.

(Mark 1 after your first choice and 2 after your second, and so on till the ballot is filled in.)

Oshawa—Rail	13
Oshawa—Boat	12
Erin	17
Jackson's Point	18
Rosebank	11
Lorne Park	10
Oakville	9
Burlington Beach	8
Dundurn Park	7
Mountain View Park	14
Brant House	15
Niagara-on-the-Lake	3
Paradise Grove	16
Youngstown	5
Lewiston	4
Queenston Dock	2
Queenston Heights	1
Rumsey Park	6

In this sample ballot the voter's first-choice is Queenston Heights, his second choice Queenston Dock, his third choice Niagara-on-the-Lake, and so on as indicated by the figures.

The result of the voting was a tie between Queenstown Heights and Jackson's Point. The best way out, therefore, was to take a second ballot, as between Queenston Heights and Jackson's Point. This was done, resulting in a victory for Jackson's Point by six votes.

5.—AN OBJECT LESSON.

To master the principles of the Hare-Spence system of Proportional Representation, there is no better way than to see a meeting-room election, and follow its details by having a spare tally-sheet and acting as extra "tally-clerk" on your own account.

Failing this opportunity, the next best way is to give a little study to the details of some actual election. It is pleasanter and more effectual than the reading of instructions for working the system.

We present herewith the tally sheet and details of an election which took place on Thursday, July 28th, at the meeting of the Toronto Trades and Labor Council. It was to choose the Educational Committee, consisting of five members. Sixty-one electors voted for eight candidates. Here is the tally sheet, followed by some explanatory notes which make it perfectly clear:

Candidates	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i
Armstrong.....	///// ///// ///// /	16	elect						
Horwood.....	///// ///	8	////	12	elec.				
Gallagher.....	///// ///// ///// /	16	elec.						
Waghorn.....	/////	5		5		5	/	6	out
Wheat.....	///	3	//	5	///	8	/	9	elec.
Moran.....	////	4	/	5		5	out		
Dowling.....	///	3	/	4	out				
Corney.....	///// /	6		6	/	7	//	9	elec.
Total	.....	61							

The names of all of the candidates are plainly written on a large blackboard, in full sight of the meeting.

Each voter marks his ballot with five names, in the order of his choice. He may indicate his choice by the position of the names without putting any figures at all; or he may write them in any order he likes, and then indicate his choice by the figures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. He understands that his vote will count for only one candidate, and that the five he marks are in the nature of alternates.

The scrutineers have before them a nest of eight wooden boxes. Fastened in front of each of these is a paper label bearing the name of the candidate to whom the compartment belongs. Confusion will result if you trust to your memory, or the face of the top ballot, instead of having the compartments properly labelled.

You commence the count by sorting the ballots into these compartments, according to the first choice votes, paying no heed just now to the second and subsequent choices. As you call out the names, two of your fellow-scrutineers are keeping tally of them. Each of these "tally clerks" has a properly ruled tally sheet, and they prevent mistakes by checking each other.

Column "a" shows the tallies, one by one, as put down. They are in groups of five, which enables the eye to follow them more correctly in counting. The fifth stroke of each group should be struck forward across the preceding four; but it would take a special engraving to show this. That is the way to make a proper tally.

Column "b" has the totals of each man's vote, got by adding up the tallies in column "a." At the foot of column "b" is the total vote cast, namely, 61.

The tally clerks divide the total vote (61) by the number of the committeemen required (5); and the result gives the quota (12), or number of votes necessary to elect. There is a remainder of 1, which is ignored, as it does not affect the result.

Armstrong and Gallagher have each a quota, and each a surplus. Each has the same number of votes, namely, sixteen. Therefore, each has a surplus of four votes.

The scrutineer declares Armstrong and Gallagher duly elected, and the tally-sheet is marked accordingly.

Armstrong's ballots having been thoroughly mixed, four are taken from the top of his pile, and the remaining twelve are set aside as being the ballots which elected him. His surplus of four is then distributed. Gallagher's ballots are treated in the same way.

Column "c" shows the distribution of the eight ballots of the two elected candidates. Horwood is second choice on four of the surplus ballots, which are put in his compartment one by one. These four ballots complete his quota of twelve, and he is therefore elected. This takes place before the surplus is all distributed, and the distribution is accordingly stopped in order to declare Horwood's election, mark it on the tally sheet and remove his ballots. It then proceeds. The remaining ballots go to Wheat, Moran and Dowling. One of the ballots transferred to Wheat is marked "Armstrong 1, Gallagher 2, Wheat 3," but Gallagher was passed over, because he was already elected, and Wheat gets it as being third choice.

Column "d" gives a fresh set of totals, with the surplus ballots added in. It shows Wheat's total increased to 5, Moran's increased to 5, and Dowling's increased to 4. Dowling is now the candidate with the lowest number of votes. The scrutineer, therefore, declares him "out of the count"; the tally sheet is so marked; and the whole of Dowling's ballots are distributed to other candidates.

Column "e" shows the distribution of Dowling's ballots. One of them goes to Corney and three to Wheat. Of these last, one is marked "Armstrong 1, Dowling 2, Wheat 3," etc. It came to Dowling in Armstrong's surplus, stayed with Dowling until he had no use for it, and then went on to Wheat, and helped to elect him, as you will see presently.

Column "f" gives the totals as altered by the distribution of Dowling's ballots; showing that Wheat is increased to eight, and Corney to seven; also that Waghorn and Moran are at the bottom

of the poll with five each. At first glance, this appears to be a tie. But on closer examination of the tally-sheet, we find that the votes of Waghorn are original first choices, whilst one of Moran's ballots is a transfer. So we declare Moran "out," because we have a rule that when it comes to a tie, a transferred vote is not as good as an original first-choice, nor a third-choice as good as a second, etc.

Column "g" shows the distribution of four of Moran's ballots. Where is the fifth? It has become null and void, because the voter had only marked four names on it, as follows: Gallagher 1, Armstrong 2, Moran 3, Dowling 4. Now, as Gallagher and Armstrong are already elected, and Moran and Dowling are "out" for want of sufficient votes, it is evident that that ballot must drop out. It might have been effective if the voter had marked another name on it; but he has the satisfaction of knowing that his two best choices have been elected without his aid.

Columns "h" and "i" show the end of the election. Three candidates having been elected, two more are wanted. Waghorn is at the bottom of the poll with six votes. He is therefore "out," and as the only remaining candidates are Wheat and Corney they are elected with nine votes each, as coming nearest to a quota. It would be useless to distribute Waghorn's ballots, but it is interesting to examine them, and see where they could have gone. Wheat is on all six of them, and Corney is on one. Therefore, if they had been distributed, Wheat would have got a full quota, Corney's total would have been increased to ten, and the other two ballots would have become null, because Wheat could not use them. But all of these Waghorn ballots contain the name of some successful candidate.

This is a good showing. You remember that one other ballot was "null." Here are only three wasted ballots out of 61—less than five per cent.; whilst in the last Toronto civic election the wasted votes were forty-three per cent. Even this comparison hardly does justice to the Hare-Spence method, because the 43 per cent. in the Toronto election were given for defeated candidates only, whilst each of the "null" Hare-Spence ballots contained the name of one or more successful candidates.

You can see also how complete and fair is the representation given by the Hare-Spence system. In electing their Educational Committee, the voters automatically divided themselves into groups of about a dozen, and each group elected the man it wanted, so that every one was represented fully and fairly; the five members elected being Messrs. Armstrong, Gallagher, Horwood, Wheat and Corney.

Is not this Proportional Representation, Effective Voting and Scientific Suffrage?

6.—DRAFT OF PROPOSED BILL.

John Idington, Q.C., of Stratford, chairman of the Proportional Representation Committee of Ontario, has drafted a bill providing for local option in representation, with a view of having the bill introduced in the Ontario Legislature at its next session, and directing the attention of the Legislature to the important question of voting methods in municipalities. The Bill is as follows:

WHEREAS it is expedient to enable certain cities, town, villages and townships to adopt proportional representation for the election of aldermen and councillors;

THEREFORE HER MAJESTY, by and with the consent of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Ontario, enacts as follows:

1. In every city, town, village and township where the council is elected by

a general vote, the council of such city, town, village or township may pass a bylaw providing for the adoption of proportional representation in the election of aldermen of such city, or councillors of such town, village or township, by any method that will result in the election of any qualified candidate who obtains at the election a quota of valid votes, the said quota being found by dividing into the number of valid votes the number of councillors or aldermen to be elected, ignoring fractions, if any; but such bylaw, before the final passing thereof, shall receive the assent of the electors of the municipality in the manner provided for in section 338 and following sections of the Municipal Act.

2. Any council providing by such bylaw for the said elections upon said principle of proportional representation shall adopt the system of voting by ballot and all other provisions of the said Municipal Act for the election of such aldermen and councillors, so far as the same can be made for the purpose operative; and it shall be competent for the said council in their said bylaw to supplement the said provisions by such further directions and provisions as may be found desirable and necessary efficiently to carry out the method adopted for electing such aldermen or councillors in accordance with said principle of proportional representation.

3. It shall be competent for any such council by such bylaw to provide for vacancies as follows:

(1) A vacancy may be filled or left unfilled.

(2) A vacancy may be filled by declaring elected the candidate who at the last general election received the highest number of votes next after the elected candidate receiving the lowest number of votes.

(3) Other vacancies may be filled in like manner by taking the candidates in the order of their number of votes from the remaining highest to lowest.

(4) Or vacancies may be filled by a new election for the whole city, town, village or township.